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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals based its finding of con-
stitutionality upon the mandate of article VI, section 30 of the con-
Stitution.154 "[T]he language of the Constitution leaves little room for
doubt that the authority to regulate practice and procedure in the
courts lies principally with the Legislature,"' 55 since the procedure of
dismissing complaints for undue delay was legislatively created and
did not arise from the inherent power of the court. 50
The Court has thus put to rest any questions as to the constitu-
tionality of a rule designed to insure that a plaintiff be given every
possible opportunity to prosecute a meritorious claim. Although the
courts and several authorities may be displeased with the result,lr3 the
only way to effectuate any desired reform is through constitutional
amendment, and this course does not appear likely.
ARTICLE 34- CALENDAR PRACTICE; TRiAL PREFERENCES
CPLR 3403: Special preference denied Seider-based plaintiff.
In denying an application for a special preference under CPLR
3403, in Tjepkema v. Kenney, 58 Justice Gold pointed out another in
the myriad of problems generated by Seider-based 5 9 attachments of
insurance policy proceeds. The action was brought against the non-
resident defendant to recover damages for the wrongful death of a
New York decedent in an out-of-state automobile accident. Quasi in
rem jurisdiction was predicated upon the attachment of the defendant's
liability insurance policy through his insurance company's New York
office. This fact pattern, of course, precisely parallels that which existed
in Seider.
1019 (4th Dep't 1969); Kull v. City of New York, 31 App. Div. 2d 638, 295 N.Y.S.2d 959
(2d Dep't 1968); Johnson v. Parrow, 56 Misc. 2d 863, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Ontario
County 1968). For a discussion of the reaction of the third department to Cohn, see The
Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 135, 151-53 (1969).
154 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 30:
The legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate the jurisdiction
and proceedings in law and equity that it has heretofore exercised. The legis-
lature may ... delegate . . .any power possessed by [it] .. . to regulate practice
and procedure in the courts.
See Johnson v. Parrow, 56 Misc. 2d 863, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1968),
where this section of the constitution was first cited in support of the validity of CPLR
3216. See also The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 498, 517-18 (1969).
155 25 N.Y.2d at 247, 250 N.E.2d at 695, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
156 Id. at 298-99, 250 N.E.2d at 695-96, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 640-41. See also 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336, 339, 345 (1967-68).
157 See, e.g., 25 N.Y.2d at 251, 250 N.E.2d at 697, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 643; 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336, 339 (1968).
158 59 Misc. 2d 670, 299 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
159 See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See also
Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58 (1968).
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The problem in Tjepkema was precipitated by the notorious
calendar delay for tort actions in New York County. For, the relatively
short statute of limitations for wrongful death actions160 operative in
most jurisdictions would probably have expired in any other state
in which plaintiff could have acquired in personam jurisdiction well
before the New York action culminated in a judgment. Therefore, if
the res in the New York action (the attached insurance policy) was
insufficient to cover the entire judgment, it would be too late for plain-
tiff to attempt to commence a second action elsewhere. 61 In Tiep-
kema, the plaintiff argued that a second action could not be com-
menced until the conclusion of the New York Seider-based suit since
only then would it be known if her claim had been fully satisfied.
Rule 3403(a) grants a trial preference "[in] an action in which the
interests of justice will be served by an early trial." However, due to
calendar congestion and local calendar control rules, few preferences
are granted and, when they are, it is only after a showing of destitution
or probability of death before trial . 6 2 Justice Gold emphatically closed
the judicial door on any preferential treatment to a Seider-based
plaintiff. He pointed out that if a preference was to be granted in the
instant case because of the possibility of a bar by a statute of limitations
in another state, an identical preference would be available to every
Seider-based plaintiff who claimed that the defendant was potentially
liable for damages in excess of his policy limitations. 6 3 This would
have the effect of giving every Seider-based plaintiff, who has the most
160 See, e.g., N.Y. ESTATES, PowEs AND TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKINNEY 1967) which
provides for a two-year statute of limitation within which the wrongful death action must
be commenced. It may be interesting to note that the other jurisdiction having a juris-
dictional basis in this action was Missouri, which also has a two-year statute of limitation.
See VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STATS. § 537.100 supp. (1967).
161 Justice Gold pointed out, however, that even a special preference may be unavail-
ing to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations where the action was commenced some
time after the accident with prolonged pretrial proceedings or intermediate appeals. 59
Misc. 2d at 672, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 944-45.
162 See generally 4 W*K&M 3403.10 (1968) (interests of justice). See also 7B McKiN-
NEY's CPLR 3403, supp. commentary 14, 19 (1964).
Mere old age is insufficient; there must be an additional showing that plaintiff will
not survive the normal calendar delay. Brier v. Plaut, 37 Misc. 2d 476, 235 N.Y.S.2d 37
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). Or, in the alternative, there must be a showing that plaintiff
is impoverished and will otherwise likely become a public charge. Kerry v. American
Warm Air Heating Co., 32 Misc. 2d 935, 223 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961).
163 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3403, supp. commentary 14, 15-18 (1969) in which
Tjepkema v. Kenney is given an extensive treatment and some of the problems suggested
by the decision are explored.
It would now appear that the policy limits of a defendant's insurance coverage are
available upon a disclosure application. Mirabile v. Fitzmaurice, 59 Misc. 2d 239, 298
N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1969). See also 7B MCKINNEY'S CPL R 5201, supp.
commentary 17, 29 (1969).
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tenuous of jurisdictional ties to begin with, preferential treatment
over all other plaintiffs who have legitimate recourse to our courts,
by placing the latter class that much further back on the calendar.164
The tenor of the Tiepkema decision is one of judicial resignation
to Seider coupled, however, with a determination that the theory of
the case should be limited where possible. Justice Gold goes so far as
to suggest that if the plaintiff will have to prosecute an in personam
claim against the defendant in his own state anyway, he might as well
do so in the first instance by bringing an action for full relief in that
state.1 5
If one chooses not to follow this course, however, the practical
solution to the problem of the running of the statute of limitations
in the foreign jurisdiction, as suggested by Justice Gold, is simply
to commence the action in the foreign jurisdiction and delay prosecu-
tion until a final determination of the New York Seider-based action
is attained. This procedure may succeed in New York if it is the forum
in which the in personam action was delayed, but it is fraught with
danger if tried elsewhere. The foreign court may decline to accept
plaintiff's explanation of the statute of limitations problem and may
demand that plaintiff proceed with the prosecution of the in personam
action. It may even dismiss the action on a motion by the defendant
which is based upon the pendency of the New York action. But the
instant decision suggests that these problems will not arise. The court
refers to rule 3211(a)(4)166 and states that a
[r]easonable disposition to permit the continuance of the subsequent
in personam action, brought when it was to avoid the bar of the
164 A prior case rejecting preferential treatment for a Seider-based plaintiff, upon
other grounds, was Margulies v. Boverman, 56 Misc. 2d 507, 288 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1968); see The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 302, 338-39 (1968).
See also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3403, supp. commentary 14, 18-19 (1968) (a decisive treat-
ment of plaintiff's endeavors to get preferential treatment).
165 It should be noted at this juncture that under Missouri law the maximum dam-
ages in a wrongful death action at the time of this accident were limited to $25,000. (Now
$50,000.) V ERON's ANN. Mo. STATs. § 537.090 supp. (1967). Therefore, this holding deny-
ing the special preference is meaningful solely for the difference between the insurance
policy limit and $25,000. And any New York judgment in excess of $25,000 would preclude
suit in Missouri.
166 See Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1969).
See also 7B MCKINNEV'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary 17, 29-30 (1969).
CPLR 3211(a):
A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted
against him on the ground that:
4. There is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not
dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires....
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statute [of limitations], is to be expected of any court cognizant of
the nature of the problem. 67
Nothwithstanding this sound advice, it is patently clear that one can-
not anticipate this specific reaction from any given court, particularly
since the validity of Seider attachments in other states is at best ques-
tionable. Furthermore, the court is assuming that the foreign forum
has a statutory provision similar to CPLR 3211(a)(4) and, that if it
does, it will construe it as we construe that section. Upon reflection,
perhaps the best advice offered by the court is to have the plaintiff
sue originally where he can get in personam jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. This assumes, of course, that the defendant has assets in an-
other jurisdiction over and above the insurance policy coverage which
could be attached in a New York Seider-based action. However, if
there are no other assets or if the judgment sought in New York will
not exceed the policy limits, there is no need for the second action. And
using the quasi in rem Seider-based action initially, a New York resi-
dent plaintiff receives the benefit of a New York jury and the excep-
tionally large verdicts for which they are notorious.
ARTICLE 41 - TmAL By JuRY
CPLR 4102(a): Withdrawal of jury demand permissible without op-
position's consent in absence of reliance.
A party to a civil action must assert his right to a jury trial by
including an appropriate demand in his note of issue at the time it is
filed. 08 If none of the parties makes such a demand pursuant to
CPLR 4102(a), the right will be deemed waived by all. However, once
either party so reserves his right to a jury trial, it is unnecessary for
the opponent to assert the right on his own behalf since "[a] party may
not withdraw a demand for trial by jury without the consent of the
other parties."'169 Thus, if a demand has been made by one party, the
other may rely upon it as if he had made it in the first instance. 170
In Downing v. Downing,'7' the first department found it necessary
to examine the purpose behind 4102(a)'s stipulation that all parties
167 59 Misc. 2d at 673, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
168 CPLR 4102(a). The party must also serve all other parties with his demand. Any
party served a note of issue not including a demand for a trial by jury may demand such,
by serving every party with demand, and filing the demand within fifteen days. Id.
109 CPLR 4102(a).
170 Schnur v. Gajewski, 207 Misc. 637, 140 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955)
(assent of all parties must be obtained before demand for jury trial may be withdrawn by
plaintiff since court is unable to speculate whether or not objecting defendant would have
independently demanded this right).
17132 App, Div. 2d 950, 302 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1969).
1970)
